Mandating Women: Defending SB 826 and Female Quotas in the Corporate Workplace by Kim, Lauren
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 3 Article 4 
Spring 5-1-2020 
Mandating Women: Defending SB 826 and Female Quotas in the 
Corporate Workplace 
Lauren Kim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the 
Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Kim, Comment, Mandating Women: Defending SB 826 and Female Quotas in the Corporate 
Workplace, 53 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 685 (2020). 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
(9) 53.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2020 4:59 PM 
 
685 
MANDATING WOMEN: DEFENDING SB 826 
AND FEMALE QUOTAS IN THE 
CORPORATE WORKPLACE 
Lauren Kim* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gender discrimination is not a new, or unknown, issue. “Glass 
ceiling,” “glass elevator,” “78 cents gap,” and “persist” are all 
common colloquialisms expressing the discrimination and barriers 
women have faced, especially in corporate settings.1 Recently, 
however, some of these colloquialisms, like “glass ceiling,” have been 
considered “outdated” as major concerns about gender discrimination 
have been reduced as the wage gap gradually closes.2 Yet, gender 
discrimination is still extremely prevalent in professional 
environments, and eliminating gender discrimination today requires 
more directed action and initiatives than those already set forth. 
California attempted to tackle this issue by instituting a law in an 
area that women have continually been blocked from—the corporate 
workplace.3 In 2018, California passed California Senate Bill 826 
(“SB 826”), which requires publicly held domestic and foreign 
corporations whose principal executive offices are in California to 
have at least one female director on their boards by the close of the 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Economics and B.A., 
Political Science, University of Southern California, 2010. Special thanks to Professor Kimberly 
West-Faulcon for her helpful suggestions and guidance throughout the writing process, the 
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all their hard work through the entire 
production cycle, and my parents and friends for their endless love and support in all of my 
endeavors. 
 1. Jessica Bennett, Who Still Calls It a ‘Glass Ceiling?’ Not the 6 Women Running for 
President, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/us/politics/glass-
ceiling-female-candidates-2020.html?module=inline (these terms “describe the inability of white-
collar women to rise beyond the mid-manager level in their jobs, and the often invisible barriers 
preventing that rise”). 
 2. Id. (“The women running for president [in the 2020 election] are promising many things 
as they make their pitches to voters. They are being asked repeatedly how being women may affect 
their chances. But so far, none of them are emphasizing the ‘glass ceiling.’”). 
 3. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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2019 calendar year.4 Additionally, by the close of the 2021 calendar 
year, the corporations must have at least two female directors if there 
are five or more board directors and at least three female directors if 
there are six or more board directors.5 If a corporation fails to comply 
with these terms, it will be fined $100,000 for the first violation and 
$300,000 for each subsequent yearly violation.6 Although similar rules 
have been adopted in other countries like France and Norway, 
California is the first state in the United States to pass a bill instituting 
a mandatory corporate quota.7 
SB 826 is justified because the effects of gender discrimination 
are most pronounced in corporate boards and management positions. 
Latest statistics show women are more likely than men to hold four-
year degrees, but women mainly work in middle-skill occupations that 
only require some training or education beyond high school.8 These 
middle-skill occupations typically have lower average earnings than 
occupations with a predominantly male workforce such as IT, 
transportation, and manufacturing.9 Women make up only 5% of the 
Fortune 500 CEOs, 7% of the top executives in the Fortune 500, 10% 
of the top management positions in the S&P 1500, and 19% of the 
S&P 1500 board seats.10 
Unfortunately, the California legislature has already faced 
incredible backlash and opposition for SB 826, as California-based 
companies claim the requirement is unconstitutional and violates the 
 
 4. Id. (adding sections 301.3 and 2115.5 to the California Corporations Code). 
 5. Id. (defining female as an individual who self-identifies her gender as a woman). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See William Sprouse, California to Require Women on Boards, CFO (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.cfo.com/governance/2018/10/california-to-require-women-on-boards/ (“In 2017, 
Pennsylvania passed a resolution urging public and private companies to have a minimum of 30% 
women on their boards by 2020, but that law does not impose penalties.”); see also Jill E. Fisch & 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, California’s “Women on Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory 
Competition, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with the Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law) (describing “the proliferation of jurisdictions that have adopted legislation imposing gender 
quotas on corporate boards”). 
 8. NAT’L COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX AT 45: CAREER & TECHNICAL 
EDUCATION: A PATH TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (2017), https://www.ncwge.org/TitleIX45/ 
Career%20and%20Technical%20Education.pdf. 
 9. Id. (“Women are concentrated in fields such as child care, preschool education, home care, 
and hairdressing—all occupations with median earnings for full-time work that would leave a 
family of three in near-poverty.”). 
 10. JUDITH WARNER ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP GAP: 
WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP BY THE NUMBERS 5 (2018), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/ 
uploads/2018/11/19121654/WomensLeadershipFactSheet.pdf. 
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Equal Protection Clause.11 The Equal Protection Clause states that no 
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”12 A corporate quota mandating women raises 
the issue of whether, in the efforts to foster equality for women, 
inequality is created elsewhere. Two parties have already filed suits 
against the state of California claiming that SB 826 deprives men of 
equal protection and relies on a variety of stereotypes about women.13 
Both parties claim that California’s quota and initiative classify on the 
basis of gender, which triggers a heighted scrutiny.14 Intermediate 
scrutiny is applied to gender classifications, as such classifications 
must be substantially related to an important government interest.15 
How the courts apply intermediate scrutiny has not always been 
straightforward.16 In United States v. Virginia,17 a case regarding a 
male-only military college in Virginia, the Supreme Court utilized an 
intermediate standard of review in analyzing whether this admission 
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.18 Virginia, however, led 
to confusion because the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in a 
rigorous way, closer to strict scrutiny.19 Lower courts were left to 
apply this unclear test of intermediate scrutiny in various gender 
discrimination claims.20 Most recently in Nguyen v. Immigration & 
 
 11. See Complaint at 5–6, Meland v. Padilla, No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 
2019), 2019 WL 6037825; Amended Complaint at 4–5, Crest v. Padilla, No. 19STCV27561 (Super. 
Ct. Cal. Sep. 20, 2019). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 13. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v. 
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 14. Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v. Padilla, 
supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 
(1976) (holding that an intermediate-level of scrutiny is applied to gender classifications). 
 16. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138 
(2011) (“Since the outcome of an equal protection case is largely determined by whether the group 
is designated as a suspect, quasi-suspect, or non-suspect class, one may assume that the test for 
distinguishing between the three types of classes has been carefully crafted and precisely defined. 
But despite decades of case law on this specific issue, nothing could be further from the truth.”). 
 17. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 18. Id. at 515–16. 
 19. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and 
Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and 
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 238 (2002) (“[T]he opinion ultimately 
seemed to require that the State of Virginia show an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for its 
gender discrimination at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship 
to important government interests.”). 
 20. Id. 
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Naturalization Service,21 the Court returned to the “substantially” 
related version of intermediate scrutiny.22 These two cases left the 
lower courts with two different understandings of the government 
engaging in stereotyping. 
Applying intermediate scrutiny to corporate quotas like SB 826, 
however, is relatively straightforward. In Califano v. Webster,23 the 
Court addressed whether a provision in the Social Security Act that 
calculates benefits for women in a more advantageous way is 
unconstitutional because it directly compensates women for past 
economic and employment discrimination.24 The Court found that the 
favorable treatment of women was justified because the provision’s 
purpose was to redress society’s longstanding disparate treatment of 
women.25 Allowing women to benefit favorably through their wage is 
constitutional.26 This is directly relevant and applicable to SB 826, 
which claims that adding women on corporate boards responds to 
years of gender discrimination in these California companies.27 Yet, 
neither of the plaintiffs acknowledges Califano in their complaints 
opposing SB 826.28 This seems odd when Califano addresses a 
situation where differing treatment of men and women is justified and, 
even more specifically, a situation like SB 826, which tries to remedy 
discrimination against women in the job market. 
Improving access to corporate opportunities for women is not 
only necessary but also constitutional. This Note argues for the 
constitutionality of female corporate quotas, such as California’s SB 
826. Part II briefly summarizes the history of the Equal Protection 
Clause in regard to gender-based classifications and intermediate 
scrutiny, and the development of California’s SB 826 and corporate 
quotas. Part III applies the modern Equal Protection Clause framework 
of intermediate scrutiny to SB 826. Part IV addresses the current 
lawsuits and opposition against SB 826 and California’s mandated 
quotas in the context of the Califano decision. Part V considers the 
 
 21. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 22. Id. at 53. 
 23. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
 24. Id. at 313–14. 
 25. Id. at 317. 
 26. Id. at 318. 
 27. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 28. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v. 
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
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future potential consequences of corporate quotas for the courts and 
society. Part VI concludes. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Development of the Equal Protection Clause 
in Regard to Gender Discrimination 
When the United States Constitution was written, it contained no 
laws affording its citizens equal protection of the laws.29 The 
Fourteenth Amendment, along with the Equal Protection Clause, was 
added after the Civil War in response to the widespread discrimination 
against former slaves.30 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not 
apply to women, and women could not vote until the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment.31 Married women also could not contract, 
hold property, litigate for themselves, or control their own earnings.32 
With such few rights clearly laid out for women, few women felt the 
need to litigate gender equality suits after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the few women who tried were 
unsuccessful.33 
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court adhered to a two-tier 
standard of review for equal protection claims: strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review.34 The standard of review was determined by the 
classification.35 A classification is the denial of rights to a group made 
of similarly situated individuals while granting these same rights to 
other groups.36 Strict scrutiny is applied to suspect classifications, 
which include race and national origin.37 To survive strict scrutiny, the 
classification used by the government must be narrowly tailored to 
 
 29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); George B. Daniels & Rachel Pereira, Equal 
Protection as a Vehicle for Equal Access and Opportunity: Constance Baker Motley and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Education Cases, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2017). 
 30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2017). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 725. 
 32. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal 
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162–63 (1979); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 
883. 
 33. Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 163. 
 34. Id. at 164. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 726–27. 
 37. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944), abrogated on other 
grounds by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
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serve a compelling government interest.38 A rational basis standard of 
review is applied to non-suspect classifications, which include age, 
disability, wealth, and sexual orientation.39 To survive a rational basis 
review, the classification merely needs to be rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.40 At the time, it was unclear which 
standard of review would apply to gender or sex classifications. Sex 
was similar to race and national origin because it was an immutable 
and immediately visible characteristic, and additionally, there were 
biological differences between females and males.41 Intermediate 
scrutiny, which is how gender classifications are currently reviewed, 
did not appear until later when courts tried to fit gender classifications 
into one of these two existing standards of review.42 
In 1971, the Supreme Court first invalidated a gender 
classification in Reed v. Reed,43 where the Court held that an Idaho 
law was unconstitutional because the government’s claimed purpose 
of administrative convenience—that it was cheaper to choose men—
was unreasonable and merely arbitrary.44 At the time, the Court stated 
that it applied a rational basis standard of review, but if the Court had 
truly applied rational basis review, the law would have been upheld 
because the classification would have been rationally related to the 
purpose that it was administratively cheaper to choose men. 
Only two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,45 the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny because sex, like race and national origin, 
could have been considered an inherently suspect classification.46 The 
Court claimed that sex was a suspect classification because there was 
a history of gender-based classifications used for purposeful 
discrimination, gender was an immutable characteristic, gender 
impacted women’s ability to influence the political process, and 
 
 38. Id. at 219 (holding that the executive order ordering Japanese-Americans to move to 
relocation camps classifying on race and national origin did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because there was a compelling government interest of national security). 
 39. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976). 
 40. Id. at 314 (holding that the Massachusetts statute requiring police officers to retire at age 
fifty, classifying on basis of age, was constitutional because it furthered a legitimate state goal of 
ensuring physical health and vitality of police officers). 
 41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 883. 
 42. See generally id. at 883–97 (describing the history of intermediate scrutiny). 
 43. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 44. Id. at 74. 
 45. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 46. Id. at 683–88 (explaining how and why sex and gender are not non-suspect classifications 
and are closer to the suspect classifications of race and national origin). 
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gender-based discrimination was typically based on stereotypes and 
stigmas that had no relationship to an individual’s actual capabilities.47 
In 1976, the Court adopted and agreed on an intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review as the appropriate level of review for gender 
classifications in Craig v. Boren.48 The Court set forth a new standard 
of review stating that in order “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge 
. . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”49 Since Craig, the Court has reaffirmed an intermediate 
level of scrutiny for gender classifications.50 In the Supreme Court’s 
evaluation of gender classifications in Virginia, the Court used 
intermediate scrutiny.51 Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a male-only 
school that excluded women, relied entirely on outdated and 
overbroad gender stereotypes of the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women, which were not substantially related to an 
important government purpose.52 Most recently in 2001, the Supreme 
Court decided another gender classification case with Nguyen.53 At 
issue was the citizenship statute that made it more difficult for a child 
born abroad and out of wedlock to a United States father to claim 
citizenship than if the child were born to a Untied States mother under 
the same circumstances.54 The Court held that a citizenship statute was 
constitutional.55 
Since the Court’s examination of gender-based classifications in 
the 1970s, it has applied all three levels of scrutiny. Therefore, it is 
currently unclear how the Court will apply intermediate scrutiny to 
regulations classifying on the basis of gender in the future.56 Will the 
Court continue using the traditional intermediate level of scrutiny, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 49. Id. at 197. 
 50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 892 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
(1996); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1977)). 
 51. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 534. 
 53. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 59–60. 
 55. Id. at 60–61. 
 56. Desiree Palomares, Comment, The Fallacy of the Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis, 97 
DENV. L.F. 95, 98 (2019) (“Although the Supreme Court has designated the intermediate scrutiny 
standard for gender-based classifications, there is little guidance for the proper application of the 
standard.”). 
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which was created to exist in between strict scrutiny and a rational 
basis review? Or depending on the understanding of the rule, will the 
Court possibly revert to using a stricter understanding of intermediate 
scrutiny as articulated by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia? Many scholars 
and lower court judges believe that the majority’s interpretation of 
intermediate scrutiny in Virginia, which required “an exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for gender classification applied a more 
rigorous standard of review closer to strict scrutiny.57 It created some 
confusion about how intermediate scrutiny should be applied, and 
whether it was even applicable to gender-based classifications.58 
Scholars have argued that in direct defiance of Virginia’s new stricter 
and heightened intermediate scrutiny, courts swung back to the 
previously known intermediate level of scrutiny that a gender-based 
classification must be substantially related to an important government 
purpose.59 
Yet, when looking at corporate quotas, or any other gender-based 
affirmative action set forth by governments attempting to reverse prior 
discrimination, the Court, and even the lower courts, have been 
relatively straightforward in how they apply intermediate scrutiny.60 
In Califano, the Court upheld a Social Security provision allowing 
women to eliminate low-earning years from the calculation of their 
benefits because it remedied past discrimination.61 Laws that are “self-
consciously and deliberately” set forth to compensate for years of 
 
 57. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 571–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority raised the 
level of scrutiny to strict scrutiny, which was unprecedented); Heather L. Stoboaugh, Comment, 
The Aftermath of United States v. Virginia: Why Five Justices Are Pulling in the Reins on the 
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification”, 55 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2002) (stating that 
Ginsburg’s use of “exceedingly persuasive justification” in the majority opinion led to a stricter 
test for gender-based classifications). 
 58. See generally Palomares, supra note 56, at 96–97 (courts applying the “substantially 
related” framework). 
 59. Id.; see also Amy Hinkley, Note, Scrutinize This!: The Questionable Constitutionality of 
Gender-Conscious Admissions Policies Utilized by Public Universities, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 350 
(2010) (“Regardless of the standard applied, the Court’s method of determining whether a 
challenged classification has violated the Equal Protection Clause involves a review of the asserted 
purpose for the classification and a review of the relationship between the purpose and the 
challenged classification.”). 
 60. See Angelo Guisado, Reversal of Fortune: The Inapposite Standards Applied to Remedial 
Race-, Gender-, and Orientation-Based Classifications, 92 NEB. L. REV. 1, 34 (2013) (“The 
majority of circuit courts have adhered to a consistent application of intermediate scrutiny in 
assessing gender-based classifications regardless of invidious or remedial purpose.”). 
 61. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314–16 (1977). 
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gender discrimination are constitutional.62 The favorable treatment of 
the “female wage earner enacted here was not a result of ‘archaic and 
overbroad generalizations’ about women” or any kind of stereotypes 
about women.63 Ultimately, while there are areas that the lower courts 
and the Supreme Court still have to address with regard to rules on 
gender-based classifications, the favorable treatment of women in the 
job market has been addressed, and the Court has ruled it 
constitutional.64 
B.  Development of California SB 826 and Corporate Quotas 
Historically, most corporate boards are comprised of men, and 
even as gender gaps are closing, 99 percent of corporate boards of 
directors are still predominantly male.65 These corporate boards are 
essential to a company’s life because they make decisions in directing 
and overseeing the actions of both the company and the chief 
executive officer.66 In a direct effort to bring females into these 
boardrooms, SB 826 was passed by the California state legislature. SB 
826 requires foreign and domestic publicly-held companies in 
California to have at least one woman on their board of directors by 
the end of 2019, and more women by the end of 2021 (depending on 
the size of the board).67 If corporations do not follow these guidelines, 
they will be subject to a fine.68 In the findings supporting SB 826, the 
California legislature noted the importance of a corporate quota as 
“studies predict[ed] that it [would] take over 40 or 50 years to achieve 
gender parity, if something [was] not done proactively” and also 
 
 62. Id. at 320 (emphasizing that the statute in question was “deliberately enacted to 
compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women”); see also John E. Morrison, 
Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Difference Dilemma, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 974–76 
(1994) (discussing the debate of whether equality means “having the same rules apply to everyone, 
or having the rules apply the same to everyone”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing 
Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 746 (2002) (“[L]aws self-consciously and deliberately 
enacted to compensate for past discrimination against women . . . might be upheld.”). 
 63. Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)) 
(discussing stereotypes about women “such as casual assumptions that women are ‘the weaker sex’ 
or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents”); see also Morrison, supra note 62, at 975 
(discussing implicit assumptions about women). 
 64. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 320. 
 65. Jeff Green et al., Wanted: 3,732 Women to Govern Corporate America, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-women-on-boards/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 68. Id. 
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highlighted that companies would perform better because boards tend 
to work more effectively with female members.69 
California’s new law has been controversial because it is 
perceived as being discriminatory to both men and women.70 In 
opposition to SB 826, the California Chamber of Commerce and 
twenty-nine California businesses sent a letter to the California Senate 
arguing that if the companies were presented with a situation in which 
two equally qualified candidates, one male and one female, were 
applying for a director position, the company would be forced to 
choose the female candidate and deny the male solely because of their 
genders.71 From a different perspective, other opponents of these 
corporate quotas believe these kinds of female-focused initiatives only 
serve to discredit the progress women have already made without 
government mandates or quotas and “undermine the achievements of 
future female hires.”72 
Currently, the two lawsuits objecting to SB 826 claim that the law 
violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.73 While one of the 
complaints claims that SB 826 expends taxpayer funds and resources, 
both are centered around the idea that SB 826 discriminates against 
men.74 The courts have yet to rule on the constitutionality of SB 826, 
but they will have to answer whether these mandates are constitutional 
and will set precedent for the other states that want to implement 
 
 69. See id. § 1 (listing the California legislature’s findings about why this bill is necessary for 
the progression of gender parity). Contra Laurel Wamsley, California Becomes 1st State to 
Require Women on Corporate Boards, NPR (Oct. 1, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
10/01/653318005/california-becomes-1st-state-to-require-women-on-corporate-boards 
(“The Economist also found that some of the benefits touted for increasing the number of women 
on boards—such as closing the wage gap between men and women, or having an effect on company 
decision-making—haven’t necessarily come to pass.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Letter from Cal. Chamber of Commerce et al. to Members of Cal. State Senate 
(Aug. 30, 2018), http://blob.capitoltrack.com/17blobs/713497c1-4d2f-4865-acb1-6492b4a2ad1c 
(opposing SB 826 on the grounds that it would discriminate against males). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See, e.g., Anastasia Boden, Op-Ed: Setting Quotas on Women in the Boardroom Is 
Probably Unconstitutional. It Also Doesn’t Work, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2019, 3:05 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-boden-quotas-women-corporate-boards-
unconstitutional-20190708-story.html (written by the attorney representing the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, the party bringing suit against the California state for SB 826). 
 73. See Jane Edison Stevenson & Tierney Remick, California Law Mandating Women 
Directors Is Challenged, CFO (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.cfo.com/governance/2019/11/ 
california-law-mandating-women-directors-is-challenged/. 
 74. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v. 
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
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similar laws. Although California is the first state to pass a mandatory 
corporate quota, more states hope to pass similar legislation.75 
The issue has also come up in the implementation of gender party 
quotas to raise women’s political representation. These quotas would 
require a certain percentage of female candidates on a party list.76 The 
United States Democratic Party instituted a party level quota with an 
Equal Division Rule, which required National Convention delegates 
to be equally divided between men and women.77 Similar to corporate 
quotas, the Equal Division Rule was also created to encourage 
women’s active participation in the political process, rectifying years 
of past discrimination towards women in the political process.78 This 
rule has also been opposed by men and women as they claim it 
restricted men’s voting rights and ultimately created more 
inequality.79 Although corporate quotas are a great starting point in 
remedying centuries of discrimination against women, the question of 
their constitutionality will have to be addressed, especially as many 
besides those bringing lawsuits against the state of California have 
already begun to weigh in on the issue.80 
III.  MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF SB 826 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court and lower courts will 
soon have to address whether these female quotas created to combat 
gender inequality violate the Equal Protection Clause. In analyzing the 
Equal Protection Clause and the female-focused initiatives and quotas, 
the first issue the Court must address is how the law classifies.81 All 
laws classify because they either try to distinguish or create disparity 
in some way, but laws that discriminate are either facially or non-
 
 75. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73 (stating that several states are considering similar 
laws, but similar statutes are already in place in other nations like France and Norway). 
 76. Lisa Schnall, Note, Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Rule, 
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 382 (2005). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 405. 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 392 (citing Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 
1987)). 
 80. See Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1123, 1139 (2013) 
(“In the domains where women remain disadvantaged or underrepresented, this tension remains 
masked, as the two rationales converge to support positive measures to eradicate women’s 
disadvantage. But in the domains where women are beginning to outperform men, should gender 
balance be manufactured? This question has direct relevance to the United States.”). 
 81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 726. 
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facially discriminatory.82 A facial classification exists on the face of 
the law when the law draws a distinction based on a particular 
characteristic, like race or gender.83 In contrast, a non-facial 
classification is facially neutral but has a discriminatory impact and is 
passed to achieve a discriminatory purpose.84 Here, corporate quotas 
facially classify based on gender because SB 826 requires a minimum 
number of women to be on corporate boards.85 
Second, the courts will address what level of scrutiny or standard 
of review applies. Courts will apply one of three different levels of 
review: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate scrutiny; or (3) rational 
basis review.86 As stated above, gender-based classifications are 
subject to an intermediate scrutiny, and Califano provides an 
analogous precedent to follow and abide by.87 
Moreover, in examining the constitutionality of a law, courts 
evaluate the law’s ends and means. For intermediate scrutiny, the 
government has the burden of proof to show the law’s end is 
important.88 Additionally, the means to achieve the end should not be 
excessively overinclusive or underinclusive.89 A law is underinclusive 
if it fails to include all of the individuals who should be included to 
accomplish the law’s purpose or end.90 A law is overinclusive if the 
law includes individuals whose inclusion does not help accomplish the 
law’s purpose.91 Intermediate scrutiny requires a somewhat close fit, 
but it is possible for a law to both be underinclusive and 
overinclusive.92 Putting all this together, intermediate scrutiny 
examines whether a gender-based classification (means) is 
substantially related to an important government interest (end). This 
Note will apply intermediate scrutiny as applied by Califano to 
 
 82. Id. at 726–27. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 727. 
 85. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 86. Kelso, supra note 19, at 227–28. 
 87. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314–19 (1977); Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. 
INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and 
Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 187–88 (2003) (providing framework for analyzing laws that facially 
classify based on gender). 
 88. See Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 729. 
 89. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 729–30. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 730. 
 92. Id. 
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determine whether these affirmative action programs and laws 
mandating women meet the required level of scrutiny. 
For an intermediate level of review, the government gender 
classification, or means, must be substantially related to an important 
government interest, or end. The California legislature set forth 
specific reasons and purposes for imposing a corporate quota. They 
wanted to “boost the California economy, improve opportunities for 
women in the workplace, . . . protect California taxpayers, 
shareholders, and retirees,” and “achieve gender parity.”93 Similar to 
Craig, where the Court referred to statistics showing that 0.18 percent 
of females versus 2 percent of males between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty were arrested for drunk driving in support of Oklahoma law 
banning men under twenty-one from drinking,94 statistics also were 
given great weight in support of passing SB 826.95 For example, SB 
826 cited to numerous studies which concluded that companies tend 
to perform more effectively with women on corporate boards. 96 Other 
studies have concluded even the number of women correlates with the 
board’s overall effectiveness, as having three women on a board, 
rather than one or none, increases the board’s overall effectiveness.97 
Unlike in Craig, where the Court held that statistics did not form the 
proper basis for gender classification, the statistical evidence here 
supports gender classification because the law attempts to create 
gender parity and gender is a legitimate proxy for corporate quotas.98 
The ends for female-specific corporate quotas are premised on 
promoting women’s interest in corporate positions, raising confidence 
of women to participate in these positions, expanding opportunities for 
women in areas traditionally dominated by men, and even reducing 
barriers for men seeking entry into “female fields.”99 Under Califano 
and a traditional intermediate scrutiny analysis, the end here would be 
important. In gender-based affirmative action cases, the Court has 
 
 93. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–02 (1976). 
 95. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 96. See id. § 1(c)–(g). 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 201–02. 
 99. See NAT’L COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., supra note 8, at 1; STEM for Girls, 
UNIV. OF CAL. DAVIS, https://wrrc.ucdavis.edu/programs/academic/stem-4-girls (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2020) (advertising a public university’s STEM program for young girls to build confidence 
and foster interest in joining STEM fields). 
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accepted remedying societal gender discrimination and differences in 
opportunities as an “important governmental objective.”100 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, California is likely to show an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for including women in the 
boardroom. Unlike Virginia, in which a male-only school in Virginia 
tried to defend its single-sex school system by using overbroad 
generalizations about women and their abilities, the purpose and 
justification of California’s corporate quota in improving 
opportunities for women in the boardroom does not rely on stereotypes 
about the legal or economic inferiority of women.101 Justice Ginsburg, 
in the majority opinion of Virginia, and the per curiam opinion of 
Califano, clearly stated that gender-based classifications may be used 
to compensate women for economic disabilities and to promote equal 
employment opportunities and that these are exceedingly persuasive 
justifications.102 The Court does not tolerate laws grounded in “archaic 
and overbroad generalizations” about women, like that a woman’s role 
is only in the home, not the corporate workplace.103 Nor does the court 
tolerate any laws based on a traditional notion that women depend on 
men financially.104 
On the other hand, opponents of these quotas may argue that such 
justification is not exceedingly persuasive because a rights-based 
framework is designed to guard against exclusion or any explicit 
discrimination.105 Although there is a history of women who were 
unable to join corporate board positions, SB 826 only expands the 
diversity of women and denies opportunities to men. In Virginia, the 
Court stated that a policy denying women an equal opportunity to 
participate and contribute to society their individual talents simply 
because they were women was unconstitutional and violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.106 The majority in Virginia was only seeking to put 
forth a public policy argument that a male-only school violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by denying women and did not consider that 
 
 100. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722–25, 728–29 (1982) 
(intermediate scrutiny must be applied free of fixed stereotypes about men’s and women’s abilities). 
 101. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515–16, 532–33 (1996). 
 102. Id. at 533; Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977). 
 103. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, A Dilemma of Doctrinal Design: Rights, Identity, and the Work-
Family Conflict, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2013) (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 198). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 385. 
 106. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. 
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a female-only policy could have a similar discriminatory effect and, 
therefore, could also be unconstitutional.107 Economic disparity 
favoring females is exceedingly persuasive when evaluating the 
history of women in the workplace, but economic disparity favoring 
males is not.108 
Pacific Legal Foundation, one of the parties bringing suit against 
California in relation to SB 826, contends that women have been 
making progress in corporate environments without quotas or laws 
and do not need the unsolicited help.109 While it is true that statistically 
women have been making progress, corporate boardrooms have other 
barriers to entry that women have been unable to overcome.110 
Vacancies on a board of directors are rare, and when there is an 
opening, a personal connection or recommendation of a current 
director, who is almost always a man, wins out.111 Another argument 
against quotas is that in the pursuit of including women, men are  
excluded as a result. A common example involves one male and one 
female candidate applying for the same position, requiring a company 
to be forced to choose the female candidate to meet its quota. This is 
a valid concern, but according to Califano, it would be reasonable to 
give the position to the female candidate, who has lived in and is a 
product of years of discrimination in labor and economics, if both 
candidates are equally qualified.112 Ultimately, a court will be likely 
to conclude that California can show an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for corporate board quotas. 
The relationship between the means and end of creating gender 
parity in the boardroom is a very tight fit. Although women are slowly 
beginning to hold executive and senior positions, there is still a very 
small percentage of women in board seats.113 The job market has been, 
 
 107. See id. at 532–33. 
 108. See Deborah Brake et al., Centennial Panel: Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: 
Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 n.32 (1997). 
 109. See Boden, supra note 72. 
 110. See Green et al., supra note 65. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 313–14 (1977). 
 113. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2018) (“As of June 2017, among the 
446 publicly traded companies included in the Russell 3000 index and headquartered in California, 
representing nearly $5 trillion in market capitalization, women directors held 566 seats, or 15.5 
percent of seats, while men held 3,089 seats, or 84.5 percent of seats. More than one-quarter, 
numbering 117, or 26 percent, of the Russell 3000 companies based in California have NO women 
directors serving on their boards.”); WARNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1, 5 (women only hold 19 
percent of the S&P 1500 board seats). 
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and is still, inhospitable to women unless they are seeking lower-paid 
jobs.114 Accordingly, this California law only seeks to include women 
on a corporate board of directors and does not allow room for 
individuals whose inclusion would not help create gender parity. 
Although SB 826 has a lot of problems and leaves loopholes for 
corporations to find an out, it does signify a step towards gender equity 
in the boardroom, which affects large corporate business decisions. 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF SETTING FORTH A 
DRASTIC CHANGE LIKE SB 826 
In 2018, SB 826 passed, and according to some projections, 
California can expect to have 692 new women on boards of directors 
by 2021.115 Although this law sounds ambitious, many have pointed 
out that a number of California companies are incorporated in 
Delaware.116 Those incorporated in Delaware may not have principal 
executive offices in California and would likely not have to follow this 
rule.117 In spite of this, two suits have been filed against the state of 
California (and many more are likely to follow), which claim that the 
law mandating women is unconstitutional and violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.118 
Although these female-focused measures and mandated laws 
were set forth in hopes of creating gender parity, they have received a 
lot of public backlash. California’s corporate quota is the first of its 
kind in the United States, and there are already lawsuits claiming it is 
unconstitutional.119 This kind of response is not completely surprising. 
A law mandating women on a corporate board is an extremely direct, 
straightforward way of injecting change into the corporate world. The 
California Chamber of Commerce and the various other businesses 
who wrote the letter to the California Senate opposing SB 826 reacted 
 
 114. Califano, 430 U.S. at 318. 
 115. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Green et al., supra note 65. 
 116. Green et al., supra note 65. 
 117. See Teal N. Trujillo, Note, Do We Need to Secure a Place at the Table for Women? An 
Analysis of the Legality of California Law SB-826, 45 J. LEGIS. 324, 329 (2019) (while SB 826 
does not mention the company’s place of incorporation, raising a question of whether the law 
applies to companies incorporated outside of California, supporters of the law rely on section 
2115.5 of the California Corporations Code to argue for the law’s applicability to foreign 
corporations). 
 118. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73. 
 119. Id. 
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in a predictable manner.120 They emphasized that they were not 
opposed to creating more gender diversity on boards but that they did 
not like the manner in which SB 826 sought to accomplish this goal.121 
They made a valid point that gender is not the only measure of 
diversity and expressed their concerns of having to potentially 
displace current male board members.122 Yet, SB 826 and other 
measures like it are necessary to institute actual change. 
SB 826 symbolizes a movement. If California’s corporate quota 
is deemed constitutional, other states will likely follow suit by drafting 
similar bills or passing similar pending legislation.123 If all states in 
the United States were to instill the same kind of change and all 
companies in the Russell 3000 had to put women on their board of 
directors, 3,732 board seats would need to open for women, and the 
number of women on these boards would increase by around 75 
percent.124 On its face, SB 826 and any female quotas to bring forth 
economic equality like that of Califano seek a positive change to 
reduce and remedy gender discrimination. 
V.  WHY IS “QUOTA” SUCH A ROUSING, STIRRING WORD?  
DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS OF SB 826 AND THE LOWER COURTS 
Given the historical and political context of a female quota and 
the changing role of women in the workplace (and especially a 
corporate workplace), it is understandable why there is such a variety 
of opinions weighing in on SB 826. A quota is perceived and 
understood as a “hard” remedy because it is a more aggressive and a 
more straightforward method of imposing equality than a “soft” 
remedy like affirmative action, which merely gives guidelines for 
organizations to follow and implement as they see fit.125 Opponents of 
SB 826 and female quotas assert that the laws intrude on the public-
private sector spheres.126 Indeed, one of the complaints filed opposing 
SB 826 alleges that the plaintiff companies and shareholders have paid 
 
 120. See Letter from Cal. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 70. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73. 
 124. Green et al., supra note 65. 
 125. See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality 
Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2874 (2008); Tracy A. Thomas, Reconsidering the Remedy 
of Gender Quotas, HARV. J. L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 3 (2016), 
https://harvardjlg.com/2016/11/reconsidering-the-remedy-of-gender-quotas/. 
 126. Rosenblum, supra note 125, at 2880. 
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income taxes and various other taxes to the state of California and that 
this money and other taxpayer’s funds would be illegally expended in 
carrying out and implementing SB 826.127 Opponents of female quotas 
argue that a quota is a public regulation interfering with the operations 
of a private organization or corporation.128 In the selection process of 
an equally qualified female and male candidate, forcing the private 
company to choose the female candidate would allow the government 
to take part in the organization’s decision-making.129 
This type of government interference is especially significant 
because a corporate board of directors typically makes the decisions 
dictating the future of the company. It is true that this government 
interference is a shortcoming in incorporating quotas, but it is a risk 
necessary in creating gender balance and an attitude that needs to be 
changed when it comes to remedying discrimination. Countries like 
Norway, which already have corporate female quotas and measures 
that emphasize equal opportunities in education, employment, and 
professional advancement, understand that the extremely close 
interaction of the public and private sectors is experimental.130 This 
experimentation, however, may explain why places like Norway have 
high economic competition rankings and maintain a form of 
democracy with health, education, and unemployment benefits.131 In 
times like today, where private organizations cannot remedy 
discrimination, it may be necessary to shift the burden.  
Another argument is that SB 826 discredits the progress women 
have made in climbing the corporate ladder without any kind of 
government regulation or public interference.132 Although women 
have made significant progress in the corporate boardroom, 
government interference has been directly impactful in schools 
through Title IX.133 Title IX bans discrimination based on gender in 
 
 127. See Amended Complaint, Crest v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 128. Rosenblum, supra note 125, at 2880. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 2879. 
 131. Id. at 2879 n.37. 
 132. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 1; California’s “Woman Quota” 
Targeted in New Lawsuit, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://pacificlegal.org/press-
release/californias-woman-quota-targeted-in-new-lawsuit/; Creighton Meland v. Alex Padilla, 
Secretary of State of California: Fighting California’s Discriminatory Woman Quota Law, PAC. 
LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.org/case/creighton-meland-v-alex-padilla-secretary-of-state-
of-california/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 133. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 
2 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/titleixreport.pdf. 
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any federally funded educational programs.134 Some private and 
public schools receive federal funds and, as a result, must comply with 
Title IX.135 Since Title IX’s enactment, there have been significant 
improvements in educational access for women with increased high 
school and college graduation rates—the number of women with 
college degrees has more than tripled since 1968—and women now 
have more advanced degrees than their male counterparts.136 While 
Title IX created and advanced educational opportunities for women, 
there are still barriers that may take time to overcome. Women still 
earn less than half of bachelor degrees earned in STEM-based 
(Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.137 In 
2017, women received only 19.1% of the bachelor degrees in 
computer science, 21.5% in engineering, and 41.7% in 
mathematics.138 STEM-based education opportunities are particularly 
important for women as people become increasingly more reliant on 
technology. 
As a result of this high demand for workers, the national average 
salary for those with STEM-based education ($87,000) is significantly 
higher than that of a middle-skill occupation.139 Schools and private 
organizations also created scholarships specifically for female 
students.140 Many of these scholarships were funded directly by public 
and private schools to encourage female participation in STEM and 
“84% of about 220 universities offer single-gender scholarships, many 
 
 134. Id. at 1. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 2–3. 
 137. Josh Trapani & Katherine Hale, Higher Education in Science and Engineering, NAT’L 
SCI. FOUND. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20197/demographic-attributes-of-s-e-
degree-recipients#s-e-degrees-by-sex. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Why Are There So Few Women in STEM?, W. GOVERNORS UNIV. (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.wgu.edu/blog/why-are-there-so-few-women-in-stem1907.html; see also NAT’L 
COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., supra note 8, at 4 (“Middle-skill occupations where women 
dominate (making up 75% or more of the workforce) pay median wages of just 66 cents for every 
dollar in middle-skill occupations where men similarly dominate.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Female Scholarships, SCHOLARSHIPS.COM, https://www.scholarships.com/ 
financial-aid/college-scholarships/scholarship-directory/gender/female (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) 
(listing different scholarships offered exclusively to females and women); Kenny Sandorffy, 
Scholarships for Women in STEM, SCHOLARSHIP OWL (Dec. 4, 2019), https://scholarshipowl.com/ 
blog/find-scholarships/scholarships-for-women-in-stem/ (“There are many organizations and 
programs that want to encourage young female students to enter the fields of STEM. They do this 
by awarding college scholarships.”). 
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of them in STEM fields.”141 57 percent of universities are engaged in 
sex-specific scholarship practices that are facially discriminatory, 
which means that they offer five or more scholarships that are gender-
specific.142 Universities also have tried more concrete measures to 
foster female participation such as altering their curriculum and 
courses. Harvey Mudd College, a college widely known for its STEM-
centered education, “revis[ed] the introductory computing course and 
split[] it into two levels divided by experience,” “provid[ed] research 
opportunities for undergraduates after their first year in college,” and 
sent its female students to a national conference gathering together 
prominent women in technology.143 Other universities and colleges 
have also been offering female-only awards, professional 
development workshops, and summer camps for middle school and 
high school students.144 Ultimately, the government’s attempt to create 
equitable opportunities for women in education has been revolutionary 
for women’s progress in schools and in their careers after education, 
and sets an example of what is possible with the implementation of SB 
826. 
Another issue that arose in the discussion of the constitutionality 
of SB 826 is which standard of scrutiny applies. Some scholars argue 
that Virginia and Nguyen set forth two different understandings of the 
standards of review, and it is currently unclear how the courts will 
proceed and scrutinize gender-based classifications.145 Currently, 
intermediate scrutiny seems rather arbitrary and is subject to many 
different interpretations.146 On the road to and from intermediate 
 
 141. Teresa Watanabe, Women-Only STEM College Programs Under Attack for Male 
Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/ 
2019-08-20/women-only-science-programs-discrimination-complaints (citing Sex-Specific 
Scholarships, STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, http://www.saveservices.org/equity/ 
scholarships/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020)). 
 142. Sex-Specific Scholarships, STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, 
http://www.saveservices.org/equity/scholarships/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 143. CHRISTIANNE CORBBET & CATHERINE HILL, SOLVING THE EQUATION: THE VARIABLES 
FOR WOMEN’S SUCCESS IN ENGINEERING AND COMPUTING 4 (2015), 
https://www.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/Solving-the-Equation-report-nsa.pdf.  
 144. Watanabe, supra note 141. 
 145. See Ajmel Quereshi, The Forgotten Remedy: A Legal and Theoretical Defense of 
Intermediate Scrutiny for Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 797, 799 (2013); Kelso, supra note 19, at 238 (“[T]he opinion ultimately seemed to 
require that the State of Virginia show an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for its gender 
discrimination at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship to 
important government interests.”). 
 146. Quereshi, supra note 145, at 799. 
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scrutiny, the Court has gone from applying rational basis, to creating 
an intermediate standard of review, to a more rigorous intermediate 
scrutiny closer to strict scrutiny, and then back to the original 
intermediate standard of review.147 This is incredibly problematic as 
the Supreme Court continues to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender 
classifications to fit certain Justices’ ideologies, instead of applying 
the standards of review based on theory.148 
The lower courts and California courts have tried to address this. 
The Sixth Circuit and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied 
strict scrutiny when reviewing cases involving gender-based 
classifications.149 In California, a lower court has concluded that 
gender is a suspect classification and, therefore, is subject to strict 
scrutiny review.150 The specific regulation at issue in the California 
case was distinct from SB 826 and the Social Security provision in 
Califano because the law in Califano gave preferential treatment 
without emphasizing stereotypes and was created to remedy 
discrimination. In addition, the California court went on to state that 
race-based classifications are not subject to strict scrutiny merely 
because they are “race conscious.”151 Nevertheless, applying strict 
scrutiny at a state level in California may lead to a different result 
because, according to the court, the ultimate goal of the Equal 
Protection Clause is the elimination of factors like race from public 
decisions.152 
There is a tension in legal thought as some believe Virginia ended 
up creating a more rigorous, stricter version of intermediate scrutiny, 
which required a showing of “exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
any classification.153 Justice Ginsburg, who authored the majority 
opinion in Virginia, emphasized the importance of having a genuine, 
actual purpose for a gender classification.154 The purpose must not be 
hypothesized simply to defend equal protection litigation, and it 
 
 147. See id. at 800–22. 
 148. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 149. Quereshi, supra note 145, at 813–14. 
 150. Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 19–20 (Ct. App. 2001) (Crest v. 
Padilla’s Amended Complaint cites to this case and it is also important to note that Pacific Legal 
Foundation was one of the defendants in this case). 
 151. Id. at 29. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. 
 154. Id. at 533. 
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should not rely on overbroad generalizations or stereotypes.155 Justice 
Ginsburg has consistently been a leading advocate for gender equality 
and equal rights for women, and ultimately, VMI and their mission 
were in direct defiance of equal protection and the fundamental values 
Justice Ginsburg stands for.156 Justice Ginsburg is famously known for 
saying, “[W]hen do you think it will be enough? When will there be 
enough women on the court? And my answer is when there are 
nine.”157 
Justice Ginsburg, however, has been highly criticized for moving 
gender from a “quasi-suspect” type of a classification to a suspect 
classification similar to race and national origin in pursuit of her own 
principles.158 Some claim that Nguyen was the retaliation and reversal 
of Ginsburg’s decision by the other Justices on the Supreme Court.159 
It seems as though the Justices fail to agree on how to apply these 
levels of scrutiny.160 
Even if Justice Ginsburg pushed gender from an intermediate 
standard of review to something closer to strict scrutiny, the theory of 
suspect classification that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny 
should be applied in evaluating gender. In Frontiero, the Court set 
forth five factors that can change a non-suspect classification to a 
suspect classification.161 The first factor requires a showing of a 
history of purposeful discrimination and how similar the classification 
is to a suspect classification.162 As mentioned above, similar to those 
of minority race and national origin, women have a history of being 
discriminated against and excluded. Even the post-Civil War 
amendments, like the Fourteenth Amendment, originally did not apply 
to women. The second factor considers whether there is an immutable 
characteristic.163 Gender is usually highly visible, but unlike race and 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 177–78. 
 157. When Will There Be Enough Women on the Supreme Court? Justice Ginsburg Answers 
That Question, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:48 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ 
justice-ginsburg-enough-women-supreme-court. 
 158. Stoboaugh, supra note 57, at 1755–56. 
 159. Id. at 1756–57. 
 160. Id. at 1779; see also Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 
MO. L. REV. 1243, 1280 (2010) (highlighting that the Virginia Court engaged in a more exacting 
analysis under intermediate scrutiny than the Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Court did 
under strict scrutiny). 
 161. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973). 
 162. Id. at 684. 
 163. Id. at 686. 
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national origin, it is something that you may change after birth. The 
third factor examines to what extent the classification impacts political 
power.164 Women have a history of powerlessness in the political 
system, despite being in a numerical majority. Women have been and 
continue to be underrepresented in the legislature: only 24 percent of 
seats in Congress and 28 percent of seats in the state legislatures are 
filled by women.165 The fourth factor considers whether the 
discrimination against the class, simply based on the classification, is 
grossly unfair.166 As stated in Virginia, it seems unfair to discriminate 
against similarly situated people when there is no real relation between 
gender and the ability to perform or contribute to society.167 Finally, 
the fifth factor inquires whether the classification is based on 
stereotypes and stigmas, which was heavily emphasized in Virginia.168 
The Frontiero factors here are mostly met, and thus, gender should 
trigger heightened scrutiny. Ultimately, however, the Frontiero 
factors are not determinative, and although gender is similar to race 
and origin, they are not the same and should not be deemed to be a 
part of the same suspect classification.  
On the other hand, strict scrutiny is warranted because 
governments should not be allowed to create laws that discriminate or 
distinguish between genders, especially on their face and based on 
stereotypes about men and women. Justice Ginsburg adequately 
described her concern for the laws that reinforced outdated ideas about 
the physical, economical, and legal inferiority of women.169 The main 
concern, however, with applying strict scrutiny to gender-based 
classifications is that it allows for the courts to strike down affirmative 
action.170 There are various programs currently in place, including 
scholarships and female-only educational programs that explicitly 
exclude men or give an advantage to women. In 1972, Title IX was 
federally enacted by Congress to try and shift the statistical gender gap 
 
 164. Id. at 685–86. 
 165. WARNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2. 
 166. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685. 
 167. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). 
 168. Id. at 533–34; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (“[O]ur statute books gradually became 
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of 
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”). 
 169. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34. 
 170. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 884. 
(9) 53.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2020  4:59 PM 
708 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:685 
in schools.171 Title IX bans discrimination “on the basis of sex” in 
schools or in “any education program[s] or activit[ies] receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”172 If strict scrutiny were applied, 
affirmative action for women in education would be struck down as 
not being narrowly tailored enough to serve a compelling government 
interest.173 Even if there is a compelling government interest, the 
classification under strict scrutiny is allowed only if no less restrictive 
alternative is available.174 Opponents of affirmative action could and 
would be able to list various alternatives to female quotas. 
“Intermediate scrutiny truly is a middle ground which allows 
challenges to laws that facially classify on the basis of gender and 
upholds such laws if they pursue gender equality. Additionally, 
intermediate scrutiny allows for a semi-loose or semi-tight fit 
compared to the “tight” fit of strict scrutiny and “loose” fit required by 
rational basis review. Strict scrutiny would be harmful to our current 
social, political, and legal progress, and to the same values that Justice 
Ginsburg advocates for. In order for intermediate scrutiny to work, 
however, it needs to be standardized and carefully laid out. Attack of 
California’s corporate quota mandating women or any similar statute 
would be a great opportunity for the Supreme Court to address a 
gender classification because it has such drastic means to reach an 
equitable end. 
Nguyen seemed to try to move scrutiny applied to gender 
classifications back to the intermediate standard of review created by 
Craig. The Court in Nguyen acknowledged that with intermediate 
scrutiny, the fit between the means and end must be “exceedingly 
persuasive.”175 In applying this standard from Virginia, the Court 
clarified that “exceedingly persuasive justification” is established by 
showing the classification served an important government purpose 
and the means employed were substantially related to the achievement 
 
 171.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX, 
supra note 133, at 2; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2015). 
 172. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2015). 
 173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 727 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is 
proven necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The government must have a truly 
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 174. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring 
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 175. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001). 
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of that objective.176 Although Nguyen did not clearly state how the 
Court planned to address gender classifications and it only addressed 
a citizenship statute, which could have been addressed via plenary 
power, it still tried to solve the problem created by Virginia and stuck 
to the intermediate level of scrutiny created for a “quasi-suspect” 
classification.177 
Some claim that the Court has been applying rational basis review 
to gender classifications simply disguised as strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny.178 As the courts move towards using a rational 
basis plus model, it becomes more difficult to distinguish between the 
three levels of scrutiny.179 Stating gender is a non-suspect 
classification subject to a rational basis review may be beneficial in 
creating more female-focused initiatives to combat years of past 
gender discrimination. It also creates an equal effect for the opposing 
field of thought. Although more laws would classify on the basis of 
gender for proper ends, it could allow for laws that discriminate 
against women simply because a rational basis review permits a very 
loose fit between a law’s means and its proposed end. This is not to 
say that rational basis is completely deferential to a government’s 
means and ends. While rational basis is still a legitimate level of 
scrutiny, the Court has afforded it flexibility.180 
Some legal scholars and professionals also believe that the Court 
has actually been using seven different standards of review in its 
analyses and suggest explicitly setting forth multiple levels of 
scrutiny.181 These models add “plus” for each of the three levels of 
scrutiny to create more gradients for separate, distinct sets of facts.182 
It seems unlikely, however, that a model with even more levels of 
scrutiny would create predictability and guidance for the lower 
courts.183 Such a system would likely lead to more confusion and leave 
more room for the lower courts to implement their own ideologies and 
beliefs. The lower courts are not immune to the political process and 
parties. To maintain transparency in evaluating laws that distinguish 
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or discriminate in some way, a simple theoretical model would be 
most beneficial for the lower courts. 
Admittedly, intermediate scrutiny needs to be rethought, but it 
does not require a complete overhaul of the current equal protection 
analysis. Moving forward, the Court should follow the intermediate 
standard of Craig and Nguyen. In both cases, the Court laid out why 
there was a middle level of scrutiny and why it was necessary to create 
a new level of scrutiny for gender. Gender discrimination is not as 
deeply rooted in history and as biological as race and national origin. 
It also is distinguishable from age and wealth. Gender classifications 
are distinctive and should be treated as such. Intermediate scrutiny 
should be maintained, as it allows for governments to institute gender 
laws that may distinguish or exclude in some way but classify in the 
direct pursuit of gender parity. 
Truly, gender does not fit into a strict scrutiny standard of review 
like race or national origin and gender certainly does not require the 
kind of exacting judicial examination required by a heightened level 
of scrutiny. It also should not fall within the most deferential rational 
basis review, which currently is more of a rational basis plus standard 
of review. Laws have been rarely declared unconstitutional under a 
rational basis review. Although it is unknown how the California 
courts will rule on the law mandating women on corporate boards, the 
Court does need to address which standard of review it will apply to 
gender for the lower courts to follow and apply in the upcoming years. 
This perception and differing views of intermediate scrutiny, 
however, do not need to be addressed in a lawsuit regarding the 
constitutionality of California’s SB 826. SB 826 and corporate gender 
quotas are simply constitutional under Califano. Califano is directly 
applicable to female quotas, as SB 826 creates economic disparity to 
remedy years of gender discrimination and inequality.184 Califano 
may have been decided in 1977, but it is still good law today and 
directly applicable to a quota that impacts economical and financial 
differences in the corporate environment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
SB 826 is a bold but necessary step California took to fight back 
against years of systematic gender discrimination. Yet, the reality is 
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that female quotas, in any realm, but especially in a corporate 
workplace, are not accepted. There is a very vocal opposition. Some 
claim that it destroys the ideas of merit, effort, and hard work. 
Lawsuits claim these female-focused programs and legislative actions 
are discriminatory towards men and reinforce stereotypes about 
women. Contrary to what these lawsuits say, however, these female-
only programs are not anti-male and aim to defy overbroad 
generalizations instead of adhering to them. These programs and laws 
mandating women on corporate boards attempt to bring change and, 
even with such drastic measures, it will take forty to fifty years for 
gender equality to be a reality. 
SB 826 is an experimental measure in California and in the United 
States. There is no precedent, but the courts are likely to address the 
issue of female quotas soon. Indeed, this Note discussed why 
corporate quotas mandating women in corporate board positions are 
constitutional and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although it is unknown how the California courts will rule on the 
lawsuits opposing SB 826, Califano provides a straightforward 
answer. Statutes, like SB 826, deliberately made to directly 
compensate women for past economic discrimination may be 
discriminatory, but they are constitutional. There is a long and 
continuous history of discrimination against women, and a quota is a 
remedy. 
SB 826, and any female quotas that other states may implement, 
may seem abrupt, but change sometimes needs to be forced. Here, 
remedying years and years of discrimination towards women requires 
a mandated advantage. Ultimately, the hope is that these new gender-
based classifications setting forth female-focused initiatives will be 
useful in breaking down the “glass ceilings” and “78 cents wage gaps.” 
As these phrases become “outdated,” so should actual discrimination 
and the concepts these phrases describe. 
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